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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1 
Amicus Curiae adopts the statements of the case and facts as set forth by 
defendants in State v. Bennett, No. 406P18, and State v. Hobbs, No. 263PA18. 
 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The identity and interest of Amicus Curiae is set forth in the Motion for 
Leave to File Amicus Curaie Brief, filed with this proposed amicus brief. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme Court 
spelled out one available procedural framework for addressing race discrimination 
in jury selection, but invited states to supplement or modify that framework as 
appropriate. In 2018, the Washington State Supreme Court took up that invitation, 
first by adopting a court rule that applied prospectively, and then through a court 
decision that constitutionalized a portion of that court rule. The court grounded the 
rule and decision in its acknowledgment that explicit and implicit or unconscious 
bias were improperly affecting jury selection in Washington, that Batson 
imperfectly addressed explicit bias, and that the Batson framework was wholly 
incapable of addressing implicit bias. 
The instant cases present the opportunity for this Court to take steps similar 
to its sister court in Washington. The Court should acknowledge that both explicit 
                                                
1 Pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 28(i)(2), Amicus states that no person or entity other 
than Amicus Curiae, its members, or its counsel, directly or indirectly, either wrote 
the brief or contributed money for its preparation. 
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and implicit bias taint jury selection in North Carolina, and that the default Batson 
framework imperfectly addresses explicit bias and entirely fails to address implicit 
bias. Under North Carolina law, and as allowed under Batson, this Court has the 
power to prescribe modifications similar to those the Washington Supreme Court 
adopted, to enforce the constitutional rights of both North Carolina litigants and 
citizens who fulfill their civic duty by answering the call to jury service. 
The rights of North Carolinians can be properly safeguarded if this Court 
adopts two key reforms from Washington State: First, trial courts should review 
and adjudicate the validity of a peremptory strike whenever a genuine concern over 
racial bias is presented. Second, a peremptory should be disallowed whenever, 
under the totality of circumstances, an objective observer could view race as a factor 
in the strike. Under this modified framework, peremptories are disallowed if a 
genuine concern over racial discrimination is present, unless the court can say with 
confidence that racial bias is not at play. This rebalanced approach acknowledges 
the pervasiveness of racial bias and prioritizes remedying racial discrimination in 
jury selection over allowing a given peremptory challenge against a qualified juror.  
 
ARGUMENT 
I. RACIAL DISPARITY EXISTS IN NORTH CAROLINA’S CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM, INCLUDING WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE 
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
In 2010, bar leaders and scholars in this state formed a Task Force on Racial 
and Ethnic Bias (“N.C. Task Force”) to consider available research and analyze the 
influence of racial bias in North Carolina’s justice system. See N.C. Advocates for 
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Justice, History of the Task Force on Racial Bias, NCAJ.COM.2 This was a precursor 
to the North Carolina Commission on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Criminal 
Justice System (“NC-CRED”), comprised of prosecutors, defenders, academics, 
advocates, and judges from this state—including a Justice of this Court. See NC-
CRED, About, NCRACIALJUSTICE.ORG (2015).3 Both esteemed bodies acknowledged 
troubling signs of racial disparity across North Carolina’s criminal justice system. 
See N.C. Task Force, Statement on Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Criminal Justice 
System (citing studies)4 and Executive Summary (same)5; NC-CRED, About and 
Projects, supra n.3. Such disparities culminate in a heightened rate of incarceration 
for persons of color in this state, and especially for black North Carolinians, that far 
outpaces the rate for whites. See, e.g., Prison Policy Initiative, North Carolina 
profile, PRISONPOLICY.ORG (data charts showing black incarceration rate is almost 
five times higher)6; NC-CRED, North Carolina Prison Population Figures and 
Demographics (same)7; NC-CRED, About, supra n.3 (noting blacks make up 22% of 
general population but 57% of prison population).  
A growing body of nationwide research has shown an ongoing and sizeable 
influence of racial bias, especially implicit bias, on criminal justice practices and 
incarceration rates. This body of research was explored extensively in Washington 
                                                
2 https://www.ncaj.com/index.cfm?pg=TaskForceHistory. 
3 http://ncracialjustice.org/. 
4 http://www.ncaj.com/docDownload/443353. 
5 https://fbaum.unc.edu/papers/NCAJ_Exec_Summary.pdf. 
6 https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/NC.html. 
7 http://ncracialjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/North_Carolina_Prison 
_Population_Figures_and_Demographics-7.png 
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State after it was reported in late 2010 that one of the Washington Supreme Court’s 
justices, at a public conference and in response to concerns expressed about racial 
disparity, stated that African Americans are “disproportionately represented in 
prison because they have a crime problem” and that race discrimination played no 
significant role. Steve Miletich, Two State Supreme Court Justices Stun Some 
Listeners with Race Comments, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010).8 This statement 
prompted an ad hoc statewide Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System 
to examine the available research and explore the causes of any race disparity in 
the criminal justice system. The Task Force was comprised of numerous respected 
organizations and institutions from across the state, including judicial and 
executive agencies, prosecutor and defender associations, bar groups, law schools 
and university departments, and community organizations.  
The Task Force ultimately issued a comprehensive report (“Task Force 
Report”) that it presented to the state supreme court on March 2, 2011, in a historic, 
first-ever public symposium the court convened to explore these issues. See Task 
Force, Prelim. Report on Race and Wash.’s Crim. Justice System (2011).9 As 
                                                
8 https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/two-state-supreme-court-justices-stun-
some-listeners-with-race-comments/. 
9 https://law.seattleu.edu/Documents/korematsu/race%20and%20criminal%20 
justice/preliminary%20report_report_march_1_2011_public_cover.pdf, reprinted in 
47 GONZ. L. REV. 251 (2011), 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623 (2012), 87 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2012). The Washington Supreme Court has since held annual symposia on issues of 
race and criminal justice. The next year’s topic was Juvenile Justice and Racial 
Disproportionality, with the 2018 topic being “Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs): 
Beyond Defining the Problem; Advancing Solutions.”  Information about the annual 
symposia, with video links, is available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/?fa= 
home.sub&org=mjc&page=symposium&layout=2. 
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explained in the report, abundant research shows that individuals in our society 
tend to associate people of color with criminality and to exhibit substantially 
divergent behavior in experiments based on the manipulation of race, often without 
awareness or acknowledgment race is playing any role, especially when neutral 
justifications are available. See id. at 19, A-17 to A-18. The research further shows 
race significantly influences decisions made throughout the criminal justice process, 
such as decisions to investigate, arrest, find guilt, or impose a particular sentence. 
See id. at 11-20, A-18 to A-20. This effect has also been shown in the use of 
peremptory challenges in particular, with significant racial disparities 
demonstrated in actual cases across a wide variety of states, in controlled 
experiments, and confirmed in surveys of the bar and public. See, e.g., State v. 
Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d 38, 43-45 (Wiggins, J., lead op.), 85-91 (González, J., 
concurring) (2013) (citing sources).  
On the basis of this information, the Washington Supreme Court ultimately 
took formal notice of the significant influence of implicit racial bias on criminal 
justice and specifically on the use of peremptory challenges. See id. at 42-50 & n.1; 
see also State v. Gregory, 192 Wash. 2d 1, 22 (2018) (acknowledging the court’s 
“judicial notice of implicit and overt racial bias” in the criminal justice system). In 
acknowledging these circumstances, the court aptly commented that it “would be 
naïve to assume” a given state “is somehow immune” from such a prevalent, 
nationwide problem. Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 45, 46-49. Indeed, a growing body 
of research specific to North Carolina shows that the same problems exist in this 
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state. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Targeting young men of color for 
search and arrest during traffic stops: evidence from North Carolina, 2002-2013, 
POLITICS, GROUPS, AND IDENTITIES (2016) (review of over 18 million traffic stops 
finding “dramatic disparities” based on race that are “growing over time” with 
“strong evidence” they resulted specifically from “racial bias”).10  
The specific problem at issue in the instant cases is the well-established 
widespread, ongoing, and material influence of racial bias on the use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude prospective jurors. Abundant research confirms the 
prevalence of this problem specifically in North Carolina. See, e.g., Francis X. 
Flanagan, Race, Gender, and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina, 61 J. L. & 
ECON. 189, 199-201 (2018) (finding racially biased peremptory usage in actual 
North Carolina cases); Ronald F. Wright et al., The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury 
Selection Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407 (2018) (same); 
Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming 
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital 
Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012) (same); Mary Rose, The Peremptory Challenge 
Accused of Race of Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999) (same). This ongoing pattern of discrimination violates 
constitutional rights, results in less diverse and less effective juries, and seriously 
undermines the appearance of fairness. See Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 41-42, 44-
50, 85-91, 98-101; cf. State v. Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 459 (1989) (noting heightened 
                                                
10 https://fbaum.unc.edu/articles/PGI-2016-Targeting.pdf. 
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state constitutional protection of jurors against exclusion based on race is meant to 
ensure the judicial system is “perceived to operate evenhandedly”).  
The default Batson framework has not curbed this enduring problem in 
North Carolina. Notwithstanding the evidence of ongoing and widespread racial 
discrimination in the use of peremptories in this state, a recent review of appellate 
decisions found that this Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals have 
almost never found racial discrimination in the use of a peremptory strike—and in 
the only two cases acknowledging such discrimination, it was against white jurors. 
See Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North 
Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957 (2016). As the 
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged in the face of similar data in that state, 
Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 46, such a track record is “highly suggestive” that North 
Carolina’s current framework is failing because it imposes too great an evidentiary 
burden for the invalidation of a peremptory due to racial bias. 
Based on the evidence of racial discrimination in North Carolina peremptory 
usage and the lack of any meaningful remedy to date, this Court is now being called 
upon in numerous pending cases to address this issue. In the instant cases, each 
defendant has invited the Court to take this “opportunity to review and invigorate 
its Batson jurisprudence” and “to instruct trial judges in the proper handling of such 
challenges.” State v. Bennett, No. 406P18, Pet. for Disc. Rev. at 1, 11; see also State 
v. Hobbs, No. 263PA18, Pet. for Disc. Rev. at 19. In other pending cases, this Court 
has been specifically called upon to acknowledge the significant influence of implicit 
 - 8 - 
 
bias on the criminal justice system, including in jury selection. See State v. Crump, 
815 S.E.2d 415, 423-24 & n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018), rev. granted, 820 S.E.2d 811; 
State v. Robinson, No. 411A94, Br. of Amicus Curiae Professors Engaged in Implicit 
Bias Research, 2013 WL 9047372 (Aug. 9, 2013). And in still other pending cases, 
the parties have asked this Court to consider reforming the Batson framework, 
pointing to Washington State as a model. See State v. Burke, No. 181A93-4, Def.-
App.’s Supp. Br., 2019 WL 944785, at *19-20 (Feb. 15, 2019); State v. Golphin, No. 
441A98-4, Def.-App.’s Reply Br., 2019 WL 657458, at *22-23 (Feb. 1, 2019).  
II. THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO REMEDY AND PREVENT 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN NORTH CAROLINA JURY 
SELECTION. 
This Court is authorized under North Carolina and federal law to modify or 
supplement the default Batson framework in furtherance of the administration of 
justice and equality. As recognized in Batson, racial discrimination in jury selection 
was declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of 
equal protection long ago. See 476 U.S. at 85 (citing Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303 (1880)). Yet the mere recognition of this constitutional principle was never 
enough to ensure it was respected. See id. at 93. Over a century later, in the face of 
continuing widespread race discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes, Batson 
set forth a three-part, burden-shifting test to replace the “crippling burden of proof” 
the Court had previously set for proving a racially motivated strike. Id. at 92.  
In establishing its new test for eradicating racial discrimination in the use of 
peremptories, the Supreme Court in Batson left each state free to supplement or 
modify that framework within constitutional limits. The Court specifically 
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“decline[d]” to “formulate particular procedures to be followed,” recognized “the 
variety of jury selection practices followed” in state trial courts, and expressly made 
“no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement” the Court’s holding. 476 
U.S. at 99 & n.24. The Court has since emphasized that states “have flexibility in 
formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson.” Johnson v. California, 
545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (noting it 
“remains for trial courts to develop rules . . . to permit legitimate and well-founded 
objections to the use of peremptory challenges as a mask for race prejudice”).  
The flexibility each state has been afforded under Batson is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s “established practice” of “allowing the States wide discretion” 
to “experiment with solutions” within constitutional limits, rather than dictating 
“state rules of criminal procedure” or “imposing a single solution on the States from 
the top down.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272-75 (2000). When the Supreme 
Court prescribes a procedural “framework” to “vindicate [a] constitutional right,” as 
in Batson, that framework is “merely one method of satisfying” constitutional 
requirements. Id. at 276. Each state remains authorized to “craft procedures that . . 
. are superior to, or at least as good as,” the approved framework, so long as 
equivalent “assurance” is provided that constitutional rights will be protected. Id. at 
272, 276. This means any state is free to change its Batson procedures to be more—
but not less—protective against racial discrimination in jury selection. See, e.g., 
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 (invalidating heightened burden for prima facie case).     
Under North Carolina law, this Court has two separate sources of authority 
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to supplement or modify this state’s Batson-related trial court procedures. First, 
this Court is statutorily authorized to “prescribe rules of practice and procedure for 
the superior and district courts supplementary to, and not inconsistent with, acts of 
the General Assembly,” as a matter of policy. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-34; see also N.C. 
Const. art. IV, § 13(2). This may include the announcement of a new or modified 
procedural rule in the adjudication of a given case. See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 331 
N.C. 122, 157-58 (1992) (noting Court adopted new sentencing rule in prior case 
“pursuant to its powers to prescribe rules of practice and procedure under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7A-34”); Peace v. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 349 N.C. 315, 328 (1998) (specifying 
applicable burden of proof after noting that “[i]n the absence of state constitutional 
or statutory direction, the appropriate burden of proof must be judicially allocated 
on considerations of policy, fairness and common sense” (internal quotes omitted)). 
In this instance, the General Assembly has merely provided for the general 
use of peremptory challenges, without addressing Batson or specifying any 
procedures to be followed to prevent racial discrimination as required under the 
federal constitution. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-19, 15A-9. As such, this Court has 
broad authority to prescribe appropriate procedures for overseeing the use of 
peremptory strikes, including modifications to the judicially created Batson 
framework currently followed in this state. And as reflected in Hudson, this Court 
would be justified in exercising this authority to reform North Carolina’s current 
Batson framework due to “practical concerns” that the framework is “unworkable” 
and does not prevent “misuse.” 331 N.C. at 157-58 (internal quotations omitted).     
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Second, this Court has inherent authority to alter or supplement trial court 
procedures to remedy ongoing constitutional violations. This Court’s “inherent 
power” includes the “authority to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the 
proper administration of justice.” Beard v. N. Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 129 
(1987). Further, under the North Carolina constitution, it is the specific and avowed 
duty of this Court “to provide a forum for individuals claiming that procedural rules 
abridge [constitutional] rights.” Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 373 (1994) (citing 
N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13(2)). In such cases, this Court has the “power to fashion an 
appropriate remedy” depending on the circumstances, including the particular right 
and procedures at issue. Id. (internal quotations omitted). This authority 
supersedes any legislative or executive power or enactment. See id.  
Here, abundant research has shown that racial bias is tainting jury selection 
in North Carolina on a broad and ongoing basis. See supra, at 6. This violates the 
federal constitutional rights of both North Carolina litigants and citizens appearing 
for jury service in such cases. See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 406 (discussing how the 
constitutional rights of both litigants and jurors are violated when race influences 
the use of peremptory challenges). It also violates the North Carolina constitution, 
which specifically provides that “[n]o person shall be excluded from jury service on 
account of . . . race, color . . . or national origin.” N.C. Const. art. IV, § 26. This 
provision gives heightened protection to prospective jurors in order to ensure that 
the judicial system operates “evenhandedly” and is “perceived to operate 
evenhandedly.” Cofield, 324 N.C. at 459. North Carolina’s current approach to 
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peremptory challenges fails to meet these demands.  
III. THIS COURT SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE NATURE AND 
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM, INCLUDING IMPLICIT RACIAL 
BIAS. 
It is often said the first step toward solving any problem is to acknowledge it 
exists. In Flowers v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the need to 
examine each peremptory strike “in the context of all the facts and circumstances” 
that surround it. No. 17-9572, 2019 WL 2552489, at *16 (June 21, 2019). The facts 
and circumstances in that particular case were so troubling, the Court was 
compelled to say “[w]e cannot just look away.” Id. The very same should be true 
here, where the broader range of relevant facts and circumstances shows that racial 
disparity and implicit bias infect the use of peremptory challenges at a widespread 
and systemic level throughout North Carolina. This Court should take notice of 
these broader circumstances as an initial step, much like the Washington Supreme 
Court did in Saintcalle, to inform and refine any reforms this Court adopts and to 
enlighten any further proposals or arguments the Court receives going forward.  
This type of acknowledgment is especially appropriate and important when the 
Court is engaged in policymaking or rulemaking and assessing whether a judicial 
standard is adequate to address a particular problem. See, e.g., Alford v. Shaw, 318 
N.C. 289, 295, 306 (1986) (deciding scope of business judgment rule “from a 
historical and economic as well as a legal perspective” and taking “judicial notice” of 
recent growth in North Carolina’s population, commerce, and industry). 
Here, there are three important circumstances this Court should formally 
and expressly acknowledge at the outset to inform its approach to Batson and more 
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broadly. First, it is known that stark racial disparity exists across North Carolina’s 
justice system. See, e.g., NC-CRED, North Carolina Prison Population Figures and 
Demographics, supra n.7 (data showing extremely disparate incarceration rates); 
NC-CRED, Jury Pool Information Project11 (reporting that North Carolina jury 
pools are 81% white though whites make up only 64% of the population). While 
disparities do not prove discrimination on their own, they are highly suggestive and 
call out for study, explanation, and reform. See, e.g., NC-CRED, About, supra n.3.   
Second, it is known that race has an ongoing, widespread, and significant 
influence on the use of peremptory strikes both nationally and specifically in North 
Carolina. See, e.g., Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 43-46, 48-49, 53-55 (Wiggins, J., lead 
op.), 85-91 (González, J., concurring) (cataloguing research and data); supra at 6 
(numerous studies on North Carolina jury selection); e.g., Grosso, supra, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. at 1542-43, 1548 (finding that even after controlling for numerous race-neutral 
factors, North Carolina prosecutors in capital cases still peremptorily removed black 
jurors at a rate 2.48 times greater than other jurors).  
Third and finally, it is known that implicit racial bias has a significant and 
widespread influence on decision-making, including in legal proceedings and on the 
use of peremptories, and thus materially contributes to these known disparities. 
See, e.g., NC-CRED, Implicit Bias Project12 (explaining that “brain science is 
revolutionizing the way we think about racial disparities and racism” and that 
“[n]ew scientific research is documenting that we all are influenced by [] 
                                                
11 http://ncracialjustice.org/projects/jury-pool-information/ 
12 http://ncracialjustice.org/projects/implicit-bias-trainings/ 
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unconscious biases and that they can dictate our behavior without our approval or 
awareness”); Task Force Report, supra n.9, at 19 (noting it has been “confirmed by 
hundreds of articles in peer-reviewed scientific journals” that implicit racial biases 
are both “pervasive” and “large in magnitude,” and “we are not, on average or 
generally, cognitively colorblind” (internal marks and quotes omitted)); Saintcalle, 
178 Wash. 2d at 46-49 (acknowledging and discussing this body of research). 
While the research on implicit bias is abundant, thorough, and compelling, 
two examples provide immediate insight into this research and its implications for 
the instant cases and more broadly. First, a 2010 episode of ABC’s hidden camera 
show, What Would You Do?, captured people’s candid reactions to actors trying to 
steal a bike in broad daylight in a public park—and in doing so, revealed how race 
regularly affects people’s perception and behavior. See ABC, What Would You Do? 
(May 7, 2010) (link below).13 In the episode, two similarly dressed actors, a white 
man and a black man, individually made obvious attempts to break the lock on a 
bike as people passed by. See id. at 0:01 to 3:37. For the most part, the white man 
was left alone, whereas the black man was repeatedly confronted and challenged:  
  
                                                
13 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ge7i60GuNRg.  
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See id. Perhaps the white actor was given the benefit of the doubt—maybe it was 
his bike and he had lost his key or forgotten the combination. The black actor, 
though, did not receive this benefit and instead suffered from the opposite 
presumption: that he was trying to steal the bike. Many of these passers-by 
presumably would have disclaimed that race had anything to do with their thinking 
or conduct. But when all the interactions are viewed as a whole, it is undeniable 
that race shaped the perceptions and behavior of the onlookers to a significant 
degree. And whether this was the result of admitted bias, concealed conscious bias, 
or unconscious bias, the outcome is the same: disparate treatment based on race.14  
 Second, a controlled experiment on the use of peremptory challenges shows 
the staggering effect implicit racial bias has on jury selection in particular. See 
Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral 
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson 
Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007). In this experiment—
replicated with attorneys, law students, and college students—subjects were given a 
criminal trial scenario and two prospective juror profiles, and were then asked 
which of the two jurors they would remove with a peremptory strike. See id. at 266-
67. The two profiles included a variety of sundry details, such as education history, 
occupation, and views on particular issues. Id. at 265-66. Only one variable was 
                                                
14 At least one federal judge shows this video to jurors to educate them about 
implicit bias. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 1124, 1182 n.250 (2012). The final segment of the video presents the same 
basic scenario, but with a white woman attempting to steal the bike, who is 
repeatedly offered assistance. The implications of this or any other forms of gender 
bias and its intersection with race are beyond the scope of this amicus brief. 
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manipulated: race. In one condition, Juror 1 was depicted as white and Juror 2 as 
black; in the other condition, their races were flipped, but all other details remained 
the same. Id. at 266. As seen in the below chart, the strike rates were dramatically 
different in the two conditions, with a strong bias shown against the prospective 
black juror—that is, whichever profile happened to be depicted as black: 
 
Id. at 267. The experimenters observed that these results “are strikingly similar in 
direction as well as magnitude to conclusions of archival analyses of real 
peremptory use.” Id. at 269. While these results are unsettling, they are 
unsurprising—once one acknowledges and appreciates the prevalence and 
significance of implicit racial bias on decision-making. 
 An especially troubling aspect of implicit racial bias crystallized in these 
experiments is that it is extremely difficult to identify the influence of such bias on 
a case-by-case basis. Take the peremptory experiment: On the whole, the influence 
of race is obvious. But when asked to identify the reasons for their choice, subjects 
overwhelmingly pointed to race-neutral aspects of the profiles, such as “familiarity 
with police misconduct” or “skepticism about statistics,” rather than race. Id. at 
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267-68. And as the experimenters acknowledged, they could not say whether any 
given test subject was influenced by race, only that race played a major role overall: 
We observed bias against Black venire members only when examining 
decisions made by several participants; indeed, for any given 
participant, we are unable to determine whether the peremptory was 
influenced by race or whether the justification provided was valid. 
Only in the aggregate does evidence of racial bias emerge . . . . 
Id. at 269. In these circumstances, precise case-by-case evaluation remains 
unattainable regardless of whether racial bias is conscious but concealed, or 
unconscious. In either form, the influence of such bias on a particular peremptory 
strike remains unobservable, while its effect across all cases is significant and 
widespread. The challenge is what to do about it.    
This Court ought not to look away from these known facts and circumstances, 
especially not for purposes of its own rulemaking. Instead, it should expressly 
acknowledge and address them. They provide the context needed to determine if the 
default Batson framework can adequately address the problem of racial 
discrimination in jury selection that exists in North Carolina. They show that an 
effective solution must account for overt, concealed, and unconscious bias. And they 
underscore the urgent need to address race discrimination in jury selection to 
ensure litigants receive fair trials and to vindicate the rights of North Carolina 
citizens who have answered the call to fulfill their civic duties through jury service. 
As occurred in Washington, formally and expressly acknowledging these known 
facts as an initial step will not only help inform the Court on how best to proceed, it 
will also ensure that further arguments and proposals the Court receives in this 
and related contexts will be properly focused, informed, and responsive to the 
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widespread and undeniable problem the Court is confronting.  
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT KEY REFORMS FROM 
WASHINGTON STATE TO ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
IN NORTH CAROLINA JURY SELECTION. 
Once this Court acknowledges the problem of both explicit and implicit racial 
bias resulting in the widespread and ongoing exclusion of jurors based on race, the 
question remains how best to tackle it. After confronting and acknowledging the 
substantial evidence of racial disparities and implicit racial bias, the Washington 
Supreme Court opted to depart from the U.S. Supreme Court’s long, failed history of 
incremental reform in this area. See Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 43-46, 53-54 
(acknowledging need for change); Wash. General Rule 37, Jury Selection (“GR 37”) 
(establishing alternative framework)15; State v. Jefferson, 192 Wash. 2d 225 (2018) 
(incorporating core standard of alternative framework as a constitutional test for all 
pending cases). This Court should follow suit.  
As recognized in Jefferson, the key issue here—and the central failings of 
Batson—is the applicable burden of proof. 192 Wash. 2d at 242-43 (“(1) Batson 
makes ‘it very difficult for defendants to prove [purposeful] discrimination even 
where it almost certain exists’ and (2) Batson fails to address peremptory strikes 
due to implicit or unconscious bias, as opposed to purposeful race discrimination”) 
(footnotes omitted). To overcome racial discrimination in jury selection, including 
concealed or unconscious bias, the burden of proof to invalidate a peremptory strike 
must change drastically from the default approach. A definitive or even persuasive 
                                                
15 https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/ 
GR37.pdf. 
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showing of race discrimination cannot be required, because in any given case, such 
discrimination is too easily concealed and too difficult to identify or prove for such 
an approach to work. Id.; see also supra, at 14-17.  
When “the appropriate burden of proof” on an issue is “judicially allocated,” 
as here, it should be based on “considerations of policy, fairness and common sense.” 
Peace, 349 N.C. at 328. While objectors traditionally have been required to 
affirmatively prove race discrimination to vindicate their constitutional rights, this 
has simply been a matter of judicial fiat rather than positive law and is subject to 
change. See, e.g., State v. Hough, 299 N.C. 245, 249 (1980); Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 
29, 47 (1953); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 400 (1945). As this Court has 
acknowledged, a special “presumption of [race] discrimination” may be warranted in 
a given context for the protection of constitutional rights, especially when a 
“procedure is susceptible of abuse,” as here. Hough, 299 N.C. at 250. Ultimately, the 
chosen standard is supposed to “reflect the value society places” on the “interest 
sought to be protected.” Peace, 349 N.C. at 327.  
Here, a comparison of relative interests and values confirms that a drastic 
shift in the applicable burden of proof is warranted. Race discrimination in the use 
of peremptories delegitimizes the judicial process, wrongfully excludes citizens from 
one of the two key avenues of direct participation in government—jury service and 
voting—and denigrates the excluded jurors. See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-09. It 
results in less diverse and thus less effective and fair juries. See Saintcalle, 178 
Wash. 2d at 49-50. It entrenches the under-representation of minority groups, with 
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each strike against a minority juror having an especially detrimental effect given 
the overall pool of potential replacements. See id. at 100 (González, J., concurring); 
NC-CRED, Jury Pool Information, supra n.11 (noting North Carolina jury pools are 
overwhelmingly white). For the excluded groups, this engenders distrust of the legal 
system and thwarts the role of the jury as an intended check on potential 
governmental abuse. See Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 100 (González, J., concurring); 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 406. Finally, all of this seriously impairs public trust and 
confidence in the judicial system, which is rightfully assigned primary importance 
in North Carolina. See Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 106; Cofield, 324 N.C. at 459.  
On the other side of the equation, the value of any given peremptory 
challenge is highly doubtful, minimal at best, and should easily give way in the face 
of genuine concerns about racial bias. To begin with, any given strike merely 
concerns whether one juror, whom a neutral judge has deemed fit to serve, will 
participate in a group deliberation process. Furthermore, studies of actual 
peremptory usage and laboratory experiments both have shown that “attorneys 
generally are ineffective” at identifying unfavorable jurors when exercising 
peremptories, notwithstanding some misplaced confidence. See Saintcalle, 178 
Wash. 2d at 103-04 (González, J., concurring) (discussing studies). No systemic 
benefits from the use of peremptories have been substantiated, and at the very 
least, any such benefits are flimsy in comparison to the grave harms of race 
discrimination. See id. at 102-08. In sum, the minimal value of peremptory strikes 
pales in comparison to expunging racial bias from jury selection. 
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Recognizing the need for a drastic reform, the Washington Supreme Court 
adopted a new rule that flips the default Batson framework on its head, presuming 
racial bias is involved whenever there are plausible indicators to that effect, and in 
those cases, requiring proof that race is not a factor to salvage the peremptory 
strike. While the entirety of Washington’s new rule warrants adoption, there are 
two core elements to the rule that accomplish this important and needed shift: 
minimalizing the prima facie case requirement and adopting an “objective observer 
could view” standard. Each of these core elements is discussed below in further 
detail for this Court’s consideration. 
A. The validity of a peremptory challenge should be adjudicated 
whenever a genuine concern over racial bias is presented. 
The first core element of Washington’s rule is to minimize the first step of the 
default Batson framework requiring a “prima facie case.” This step has materially 
thwarted meaningful review of peremptory strikes without justification, largely 
because of confusion about what actually qualifies as a prima facie case of race 
discrimination. See, e.g., Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 96 (González, J., concurring). 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has spelled out that this burden is intended to be 
met “whenever the circumstances ‘permit the trial judge to draw an inference that 
discrimination has occurred,’” and has emphasized that “trial courts should not be 
engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be 
obtained by asking a simple question,’” many courts have nonetheless treated this 
requirement as “more demanding” and highly discretionary. Id. (quoting Johnson, 
545 U.S. at 170, 172, 173). Because this requirement has precluded the simple 
 - 22 - 
 
disclosure of reasons and meaningful judicial review for racial bias even when 
genuine concerns exist, it is harmful and should be abandoned. 
Washington’s rule now broadly permits any party or the trial court to “raise 
the issue of improper bias,” and in such cases, turns immediately to the exercising 
party to disclose the actual reasons for the peremptory. GR 37(c)-(d). Given the 
normal prohibitions against harassing or frivolous litigation conduct, the 
importance of maintaining credibility with the trial court, and the fact that a 
colloquy over the validity of the objection will follow, parties can be expected to 
refrain from raising such an objection unless there are genuine reasons for concern. 
And whenever such a concern exists, given the nature of the problem being 
addressed and the relative interests at stake, meaningful review for racial bias is 
appropriate. In the rare case when a party raises a frivolous or harassing objection, 
it can be disposed of quickly and sanctions can be imposed as appropriate. 
In practice, there are a variety of circumstances that could trigger a genuine 
concern over racial bias in any given instance. One important factor, among others, 
may be whether the struck juror is a member of a racial group that historically has 
been subject to discrimination in jury selection, nationally or in the local 
community. Other factors may arise from the particular dynamics of the case, the 
jury pool, or voir dire proceedings, including the strength of the proffered reason for 
the strike. Regardless, whenever a genuine concern over racial bias is presented, 
the validity of the peremptory strike should be adjudicated. 
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B. Peremptory challenges should be disallowed whenever an 
objective observer could view race as a factor. 
The second core element of Washington’s rule is the ultimate standard for 
reviewing suspect peremptory challenges: whether “an objective observer could view 
race as a factor” in the strike. GR 37(e). The rule spells outs that “an objective 
observer is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to 
purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion” of potential jurors. 
GR 37(f). This standard is directly responsive to the key deficiencies the 
Washington Supreme Court has explained about the default Batson framework: it 
requires judges to accuse lawyers of racism, utterly fails to address implicit or 
unconscious bias, and is too weak to capture most race discrimination. In contrast, 
the “objective observer could view” standard allows for an impersonal inquiry, 
incorporates the influence of unconscious bias, and demands the utmost degree of 
confidence to sustain any suspect peremptory. In these ways, the standard properly 
rebalances the Batson framework in favor of eradicating racial bias.  
Courts in Washington and elsewhere have used this type of standard when 
the circumstances demand it, for reasons that apply with special force here. As one 
example, Washington courts apply a similar standard to determine whether to 
grant a new trial when a jury has considered extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Richards 
v. Overlake Hops. Med. Ctr., 59 Wash. App. 266, 273 (1990) (conducting “an objective 
inquiry” into “whether the extraneous evidence . . . could have affected the jury’s 
determination” (emphasis in original)). Similarly, New Jersey courts apply a like 
standard to determine whether a commercial license was properly revoked based on 
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a potentially corrupt relationship related to organized crime. See In re Pontoriero, 
439 N.J. Super. 24, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (asking “whether a 
reasonably objective observer could believe that [a known] criminal associate could 
influence the licensee”). In each instance, an objective and stringent standard is 
needed, whether because the court is barred from delving into the jury’s 
deliberations but must still protect the integrity of the process, or because 
corruption is so difficult to prove but important to eradicate for public confidence. 
Here, an objective and stringent test is needed for similar reasons, given that the 
court is practically barred from delving into a party’s or counsel’s unconscious 
biases, and might be hesitant to make any direct accusations against them, but 
must address the prevalent and problematic nature of racial bias in the use of 
peremptories and the public appearance of racial inequity in jury selection. 
When the “objective observer could view” standard is applied to a peremptory 
strike, any genuine concerns about racial bias will usually invalidate the strike, 
unless those concerns can be overcome with compelling evidence race played no role. 
See, e.g., Jefferson, 192 Wash. 2d at 250-51. Overcoming the presumption in this 
way will require a combination of an entirely persuasive justification for excluding 
the juror—likely approaching the threshold of a challenge for cause—and the 
absence of any distinctively questionable circumstances. Usually though, once there 
are genuine concerns about racial bias, those concerns will persist, and the 
peremptory will thus be denied. 
The instant cases present no exception. In State v. Hobbs, for example, the 
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prosecutor used seven out of nine peremptories to remove black jurors, and when 
the last of these strikes was challenged, the prosecutor gave eleven reasons for 
striking that juror. 817 S.E.2d 779, 788 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). In addition to the 
implausibility of the sheer number of reasons given as actual reasons, many were 
weak, vague, or uncorroborated. See id. (noting reasons included that juror “had left 
several questions on the juror questionnaire unanswered,” “had given some 
‘perplexing’ responses,” was “once singing ‘the sun will come out tomorrow’” when 
walking out of court, and allegedly “nodded affirmatively” in response to another 
juror’s statement). Regardless of the prosecutor’s other reasons and the other 
circumstances surrounding the strike, the specter of racial bias remains, and the 
peremptory should be deemed invalid.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Amicus urges the Court not to look away from what it knows—racial 
disparities exist in North Carolina’s justice system; bias, explicit and implicit, 
contributes to these disparities and affects the use of peremptory strikes; and the 
Batson framework does a poor job of uncovering explicit bias and is wholly 
incapable of redressing implicit bias. Amicus urges the Court to act more quickly 
than did the Washington Supreme Court when it first acknowledged the scope of 
the problem. This Court can act on the explicit authorization in Batson and the 
abundant authority this Court has under the North Carolina constitution and 
statutes to fashion an appropriate rule. Amicus suggests the approach taken by the 
Washington Supreme Court as a roadmap, as it will accomplish what the current 
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Batson framework does not: safeguarding the constitutional rights both of litigants 
and of North Carolina citizens who answer the call for jury service, and, in doing so, 
restoring public confidence that the jury selection process in North Carolina is fair. 
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